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1. Introduction
The last twenty years have been characterized by increasing integration
of the banking, securities and insurance markets, as well as their respec-
tive products and instruments. Largely in response to the integration in
the markets, there has been a substantial shift from the traditional sector-
-by-sector approach to supervision toward integrated financial supervi-
sion.
This paper presents the first comprehensive, cross-country analysis of
the emerging experience with integrated financial supervision. We survey
the theoretical arguments for and against the integrated supervisory model
and use empirical data to assess the validity of some of these arguments.
In particular, we analyze how the quality of supervision (measured by com-
pliance with international standards and codes) in countries with integrated
supervisors compares with that in other countries. We also use data on
staffing to assess any potential cost savings associated with integrated su-
pervision.
So, is one watchdog better than two, three, or more? Although there are
a number of theoretical arguments for and against the integrated model,
our empirical results suggest that (i) integrated supervision is generally as-
sociated with higher quality and consistency of supervision across super-
vised institutions, even though a large part of the difference is explained
by other variables, mainly income level; and (ii) integrated supervision is
not associated with a significant reduction in supervisory staff.
The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 reviews the trends in
integration of supervision. Section 3 surveys the theoretical arguments for
and against integration. Section 4 analyzes some of these arguments using
empirical data, and Section 5 concludes the article.
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licy.2. Trends in Integrated Supervision
One of the most notable developments in the financial landscape in many
countries has been the ongoing cross-sector and cross-border consolidation
of financial institutions, which has led to a blurring of distinctions between
financial sectors and national financial markets (e.g., (Group of Ten, 2001),
(Zalm, 2005)). For example, the number of conglomerates in the top 500 fi-
nancial institutions worldwide increased from 42 percent to 60 percent be-
tween 1995 and 2000 (de Nicoló et al., 2003).
Partly in response to the increased consolidation in the financial sectors,
the number of fully integrated supervisory agencies has grown rapidly in
the last two decades (Figure 1). The first countries to embark on integrated
supervision were Singapore in 1982 and Norway in 1986. In the following
years, integrated supervisors were established in other Nordic countries
and elsewhere in Europe. Outside Europe, integrated agencies were estab-
lished in Australia, Korea, Japan, and other countries. As of the end of 2004,
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Source: authors’ calculations based on data in Central Banking Publications (2004)
Source: authors’ calculations based on data in Central Banking Publications (2004)
FIGURE 2 Regional Distribution of Integrated Supervisory Agencies, 2004



















































































Otherthere were 29 fully integrated supervisory agencies worldwide, of which
about half were in Europe (Figure 2).
Prudential supervision is part of the broader framework for financial-sec-
tor regulation and supervision. The framework consists of macroprudential
surveillance, microprudential supervision, consumer protection, and com-
petition policy, each of which responds to one type of market failure (Table1).
In most countries, macroprudential surveillance is carried out by a central
bank, and competition issues are handled by a separate agency regulating
competition in general. The focus of this paper is on the middle part of
the table, i.e., microprudential supervision and consumer protection.
We define a fully integrated supervisory agency as an agency that is in
charge of (micro)prudential supervision of at least the three main segments
of most financial sectors – banking, insurance, and securities markets. Such
an agency may or may not be in charge of consumer protection. Under this
definition, a framework where one supervisory agency is in charge of all
prudential supervision in the three main sectors and another one is re-
sponsible for market conduct, consumer protection, and corporate gover-
nance (so-called “twin peaks” framework, used in Australia and the Nether-
lands) qualifies as integrated supervision. In contrast, partly integrated
supervisory agencies (which are in charge of prudentially supervising two
of the three segments), and sectoral supervisors (which supervise only one
segment), do not quali-fy as integrated supervisors. In theory, there are al-
ternatives to full integration, for instance, creation of a unified oversight
board or sharing of support services among agencies, but these are not
widespread and we do not address them in this paper.
Despite the trend toward fully integrated supervision, there is still a wide
range of models for supervisory structure that have been adopted in vari-
ous countries (Table 2). The framework for organizing supervision functions
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TABLE 1 General Structure of Financial-Sector Regulation and Supervision
Type of market  Systemic Asymmetric Market Anticompetitive
failure instability information misconduct behavior
Macroprudential Microprudential Business






Capital market  more more
firms




















Note: a Deposit insurers can have an important role in banking supervision, no matter which regulatory model is
applied across sectors.
Sources: the authors, based loosely on (Kremers – Schoenmaker – Wierts, 2003) and (Carmichael – Heming – Lle-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sis along sectoral lines (multiple supervisors), is integrated for two sectors
regardless of the objectives of supervision, or is integrated across all sec-
tors into one agency. National differences reflect a multitude of factors: his-
toric evolution, structure of the financial system, political structure and tra-
ditions, and size of the country and financial sector. The fully integrated
supervisory model can be found in a wide range of financial systems, from
very small (e.g., some of the offshore financial systems) to large and com-
plex (e.g., United Kingdom and Japan), from very concentrated (e.g., Esto-
nia) to relatively dispersed (e.g., United Kingdom), and from countries with
a systemic banking crisis prior to integration (e.g., Norway) to countries
with no recent systemic banking crisis.
Our article focuses on domestic supervisory integration, but the impor-
tance of cross-border integration will also continue to increase as the cross-
-border links among financial systems continue to grow rapidly. The recent
growth of cross-border cooperation in supervision is evidenced for exam-
ple by increasing numbers of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) among
supervisory agencies from different countries.1 There is an ongoing – even
though so far only theoretical – discussion on a Europe-wide supervisor
(e.g., (Kremers – Schoenmaker – Wierts, 2001)). Similar discussions are
taking a more concrete shape in Australia and New Zealand, which have
been working on implementing an enhanced ‘home-host’ model of supervi-
sion for their highly integrated banking systems (Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, 2004).
3. Review of Literature on Integrated Financial Supervision
This section reviews the key arguments for and against integrating fi-
nancial-sector supervision identified in the literature, largely following
Abrams and Taylor (2000).2 The theoretical literature on the subject notes
that the structure of regulation and supervision is only one aspect that af-
fects its effectiveness and efficiency (e.g., (Carmichael – Heming – Llewellyn,
2004)). Key pre-requisites, some of which are linked to the organization of
the supervisor, include clear objectives, independence and accountability,
adequate resources, effective enforcement powers, comprehensiveness of
regulation, and cost efficiency.3 However, it would be too simplistic to con-
sider the organization of regulation and supervision to be only a second-or-
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1 For example, the number of MOUs with foreign supervisors signed by the Bank of England
and U.K. Financial Services Authority increased from 1 in 1995 to 20 in 2005; for the Czech Na-
tional Bank and the Slovak National Bank, the number of cross-border MOUs increased from 0
in 2000 to 8 and 9 in 2005, respectively.
2 The literature reviewed here is theoretical in the sense that it provides theoretical arguments
rather than an empirical assessment. Formal theoretical models of supervision (e.g., (Dewatri-
pont – Tirole, 1994)) focus on banking supervision and say little about supervising non-bank fi-
nancial institutions, which is an area for future research. Also, see (Kahn – Santos, 2005) for
a discussion on allocating the lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and supervision respon-
sibilities within banking supervision.
3Abrams and Taylor (2000) provide a detailed overview of the key preconditions. Das and Quin-
tyn (2002) examine country experience with regulatory governance, which includes indepen-
dence, accountability, transparency, and integrity. Huepkes, Quintyn, and Taylor (2005) explore
the accountability aspect in detail.der problem as it may often have a strong impact on the degree to which
the key pre-requisites are satisfied.
The literature generally concludes that the question of the most appro-
priate structure for regulation and supervision is to a large extent a prac-
tical one and the answer depends on the interaction of a number of factors
that, moreover, evolve over time. Therefore, there is no strong theoretical
argument for any particular organization of supervision; there are only po-
tential advantages and disadvantages of various setups, the importance of
which depends on the conditions in place in a given jurisdiction.
3.1 Possible Benefits of Integrated Supervision
The most important arguments for unified supervision are related to ef-
ficiency, effectiveness, and issues stemming from the creation of financial
conglomerates. Merging multiple supervisors should increase efficiency,
even if only by eliminating duplicated support functions, not to mention
broader synergies. The blurring of demarcation lines among financial sec-
tors and the creation of conglomerates in many industrialized countries
have created anadded incentive to unify supervision to ensure uniform cove-
rage and competitive neutrality.
The rise of financial conglomerates has also raised the issue of how to su-
pervise them efficiently and effectively.4 Financial conglomerates cover
a range of financial services for which supervision has been typically frag-
mented and this has raised concerns about the ability of supervisors to as-
sess the overall risk a conglomerate is taking. But besides the need to take
aconsolidated view and assess group-wide risks that may not exist at alower
level, the existence of financial conglomerates has also increased the im-
portance of having a regulatory and supervisory framework that is consis-
tent and free of gaps. While supervisors try to make companies create fire-
walls between their different businesses, the effectiveness of such firewalls
could be low in the event of financial problems and they certainly do not pro-
tect against all forms of regulatory arbitrage. Furthermore, in crisis mana-
gement, supervisors need to be able to respond on a conglomerate-wide ba-
sis even if problems affect, initially, only one part of the conglomerate.
While some or perhaps all of the issues outlined above could be resolved
by close coordination and cooperation of sectoral supervisors, an integrated
supervisor is likely to be in a much better position to address them. In par-
ticular, coordination and exchange of information may be smoother within
one institution, as may the effort to close any existing regulatory gaps. For
the conglomerates, an integrated supervisor may be able to minimize
the burden of supervision as well, by minimizing any overlaps and dupli-
cation, and simplify the decision-making process.
In terms of competitive neutrality, an integrated supervisor may be bet-
ter able to ensure that similar financial products receive comparable regu-
latory treatment, leveling the playing field for all financial-sector partici-
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4 For information on financial sector developments and conglomerates, see for instance (Group
of Ten, 2001) and (de Nicolo et al., 2003).pants. This is particularly important given that the differences among in-
stitutions and products have become blurred to some extent in recent years.
Differences in regulation may give some financial services providers an un-
fair advantage, but could also encourage regulatory arbitrage as conglo-
merates would place particular financial products into the part of the con-
glomerate where the oversight or costs are the lowest. Sectoral supervisors
could be tempted to compete for “clients” by relaxing supervisory require-
ments instead of trying to harmonize supervision across sectors.5
An integrated financial supervisor is also likely to be more flexible. A sin-
gle institution may deal more effectively with possible turf wars that could
lower the effectiveness of a supervisory system based on sectoral supervi-
sors. An integrated supervisor may also be better placed to respond more
promptly and effectively to the emergence of new products and services,
which is important not only for financial innovation in industrialized coun-
tries, but also for financial systems in emerging and developing economies,
which undergo substantial structural changes.
Economies of scope should lead to greater efficiency of operations of an in-
tegrated supervisor. Shared infrastructure, administrative and support
functions can directly reduce costs. A large organization should also allow
greater specialization of staff and acquisition of technologies that may be
too costly for each supervisor separately. In the actual supervisory work,
unified data collection can help create a more efficient reporting system and
unnecessary duplication of research and data collection could be avoided.6
Economies of scope extend to staffing as well. A larger organization may
be better placed to attract, train, and retain professional staff. Ahuman re-
sources policy could be easier to develop in a large organization, which could
also offer a more diverse and interesting career path for its staff. Integra-
tion should also make it easier to share and use effectively specialized know-
ledge across supervised sectors.
Integrating supervision may improve accountability. When there is one
supervisor, it is very clear who bears the responsibility for supervision, thus
eliminating the possibility of “blame games” among sectoral supervisors.
However, the objectives of the integrated supervisor must be well defined.
Individual country cases suggest that for economies with small financial
sectors, the economies of scope from establishing an integrated agency out-
weigh the costs of moving to such a model. A case can also be made for con-
solidated supervision in a system dominated by banks, with a small role for
capital markets or a highly integrated financial sector.
3.2 Potential Disadvantages of Integrated Supervision
There are also several arguments against the integrated supervisor model.
First, if the objectives of the integrated supervisor are not clearly specified,
an integrated supervisor may be less effective than sectoral supervisors. Se-
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5 Complete competitive neutrality may not be the ultimate goal of a supervisory system because
the optimal intensity of supervision of similar products is likely to depend on the type of insti-
tution involved – as long as different types of institutions pose different degrees of systemic risk.
6 Cost savings could be also achieved if sectoral supervisors agreed to share support services.cond, the economies of scope (synergies) may be difficult to achieve as long
as the regulations across banking, insurance, and securities are not harmo-
nized. Third, there may even be some diseconomies of scope. Fourth, an in-
tegrated supervisor may extend moral-hazard problems across the whole fi-
nancial sector.
The range of objectives of an integrated supervisor may be rather wide,
from maintaining systemic stability in the banking sector to protecting cus-
tomers of insurance companies or pension funds. Therefore, if the objectives
are not clearly specified and communicated to all stakeholders, the super-
visor may not be able to differentiate among different types of institutions,
the accountability of the supervisor may be lower, and the supervisor may
struggle in the event of conflict between different objectives.
If sectoral supervisors are simply put under one roof, without substantial
organizational changes and changes in the regulation of individual sectors,
the synergies will likely be small. Creating a truly single agency without
substantial differences in style, culture, and, indeed, quality of supervision,
is a demanding managerial task. Furthermore, complete integration may
not be possible, as the types of supervised businesses and the issues under
consideration may be too diverse – e.g., from credit risk in banking to con-
sumer protection in the pension funds industry.
The integrated supervisor could become too large an organization to be
managed effectively, leading to diseconomies of scope. Very large organiza-
tions are likely to become more bureaucratic and inflexible, compared to
smaller sectoral supervisors. If the operations become too broad-based, ma-
nagers may not be able to understand the full range of responsibilities of
the organization, thus lowering its efficiency and effectiveness. This issue,
however, is likely to be very much country-specific, as an integrated su-
pervisor may be a smaller organization than sectoral supervisors in large
countries.
Moral hazard is another potential problem. Financial market participants
may believe that all creditors of all institutions supervised by an integrated
supervisor will receive the same protection. For instance, the creditors of
other financial institutions may expect – and demand through a political
process in the event of financial problems – that they will be given the same
protection as depositors in banks. This could implicitly extend the banking
safety net to other parts of the financial sector for which such safety net
may not be appropriate. While this is an informational problem and a clear
communications strategy by the supervisor would alleviate it partly, it is
unlikely to be fully resolved unless and until the supervisor acts exactly in
line with the pre-announced rules in specific cases of financial failures.
3.3 Risks in the Integration Process
It is not only the final structure of supervision may bring substantial
risks, but also the integration process itself.7 There may be a risk that:
(i) some politicians will use the fact that the supervisory structure is
open for discussion to push through the creation of a unified supervisor
quickly regardless of whether it is optimal; (ii) the change process will
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will be diminished by special interests; (iii) integration will lead to a loss
of key staff and the effectiveness of regulation will therefore be lowered;
and (iv) the technical process of integration will be mismanaged and
the supervisor will not pay full attention to developments in the fi-
nancial sector.
Once thecreation of anintegrated supervisor is open for discussion, thepo-
litical process may lead to its creation regardless of whether such model is
optimal under a given country’s circumstances or not. Some politicians who
would see an opportunity to increase their influence in regulation and su-
pervision may be tempted to push changes through quickly, without proper
public discussion, before the balance of power shifts against them. Arushed
proposal may then lead to the creation of an agency with unclear objectives,
a low degree of independence, or other serious flaws.
The integration process requires the creation of new legislation, but this
may be an opportunity for special interests to capture the process and lower
theeffectiveness of regulation and supervision. Major issues that were likely
settled under the existing system of sectoral supervisors may now be re-
opened and the resulting legislation supporting the integrated supervisor
may be weakened relative to the previous situation. Relevant issues may
concern the scope of activities of financial-sector firms, powers of the su-
pervisor, exemptions from regulatory requirements, etc. One way to mini-
mize this potential problem is to leave the sectoral legislation largely in-
tact and approve only a simple law enabling the creation of the integrated
supervisor. However, while such approach minimizes the risk that the le-
gislative process will be captured by special interests, it also lowers the po-
tential benefits of harmonization of the legislation in different sectors.
The integration process may lead to a loss of key staff or a very high level
of turnover. Any major change brings uncertainty, and, if compounded by
less than skillful management, delays or even the prospect of a loss of pres-
tige or pay, staff may decide to look for other opportunities in the private
sector or other organizations. Generally, it will be the staff with the high-
est potential that will be likely to leave. This problem may be particularly
severe if banking supervision is to be transferred from the central bank and
integrated into a new agency. The loss of highly qualified staff may severely
impede the effectiveness of the supervisor.
There is also a risk that the change management process will go off track.
The challenge of combining several separate organizations is substantial
and the managers in supervisory agencies seldom have experience with
large-scale change management. Outside experts may need to be brought
in and a detailed change-management plan needs to be developed and im-
plemented if the integration process is to be relatively smooth.
Individual country cases suggest that creating an integrated supervisory
agency can be a complex management challenge. For example, in Australia
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7 In cases where the unified supervision resulted also in merging prudential supervision with
customer protection issues, the integration involved a drastic reduction of supervisory agencies
(e.g., in the United Kingdom, the creation of the Financial Services Authority meant that
the number of financial sector supervisory agencies declined from ten to one).theprocess of creating theintegrated prudential supervisory agency (APRA)
was reviewed by Palmer (2002). The review noted that the integration was
designed in an ambitious way and without a phase-in period, which had
many potential benefits likely to be realized in the medium to longer term.
However, the review also notes a number of unavoidable short-term conse-
quences, including: (i) some loss of corporate memory due to the departure
of people from predecessor agencies; (ii) some loss of industry expertise, for
the same reason; (iii) inevitable delays in reacquiring industry knowledge
as new, less-experienced people were recruited and asked to supervise more
than one type of entity; and (iv) insufficient qualifications of some staff from
predecessor agencies or newly recruited staff. According to Palmer (2002),
these factors had a short-term negative impact on the quality of supervi-
sion.
Country cases suggest that integration should be implemented in a way
that allows the key benefits to be reaped, namely (i) efficiency of the trans-
ferring of information, experience and knowledge within the institution;
(ii) harmonization of the quality of regulation and supervision, resulting in
better supervision of conglomerates; and (iii) cost savings resulting from
the reduction in support activities. There are important risks in the inte-
gration process that need to be addressed, in particular: changing the exist-
ing “silo” culture; finding ways to address competing goals or possible con-
flicts of interest (monetary policy vs. financial stability, prudential super-
vision vs. consumer protection); accountability of results. Once the decision
to move to an integrated agency has been made, implementation should
take place quickly. A well-conceived change-management process should
aim to overcome the cultural barriers associated with the previous struc-
ture.
3.4 Where Does the Central Bank Fit In?
Another important issue is the degree to which the central bank should
be involved in supervision. There is general agreement that thecentral bank
should be involved in macroprudential surveillance (Table 1, left column).
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TABLE 3 Summary of Pros and Cons of Integrating Financial Sector Supervision
Potential Pros Potential Cons
Easier to achieve efficiency in supervising  If objectives not clearly specified, may be less
financial conglomerates effective than sectoral supervisors.
Possible economies of scope Possible diseconomies of scope if too large 
an organization that is difficult to manage.
Possibly improved accountability If objectives not clearly communicated, possibility 
to extend moral hazard problems across the whole
financial sector.
Easier to eliminate duplicities, turf wars Process of integration may lead to politically or
special interest motivated changes in supervisory
framework.
Easier to ensure level playing field across market  Process of integration, if not managed properly,
segments may lead to loss of key staff or to other problems.
Source: the authors, based on the reviewed literatureThe degree of its involvement in microprudential supervision is an open
question, both in the sectoral supervisor model (a number of central banks
have been involved in banking supervision) and in the integrated supervi-
sor model.
The arguments for and against central banks’involvement in banking su-
pervision were summarized by, e.g., Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995).
There are clear synergies between banking supervision and monetary po-
licy. For instance, the central bank needs to be aware of the financial posi-
tion of banks when formulating and implementing its monetary policy and
there is a clear synergy between the information needed for banking su-
pervision and the information about banks needed for monetary policy pur-
poses. The central bank also needs to have information about the credit-
worthiness of the participants in the payment system, which involves
an assessment of the solvency and risk management of individual banks,
and information about the liquidity and solvency of banks for its lender of
last resort responsibilities.
There are also operational arguments for the central bank being in charge
of banking supervision. Economies of scope and commonalities between
banking supervision and other functions of the central bank may be sub-
stantial and indeed stronger than those between banking and other parts
of the financial sector. The overlap in expertise and experience required for
banking supervision and other central banking functions may also allow
the central bank to attract and retain high-quality staff. In some countries,
the central bank has more independence and resources than any separate
supervisor would likely have, so inclusion of supervision in the central bank
protects supervisors from political pressures and provides adequate re-
sources – these are major pre-conditions for effective supervision.
However, the issues above can be largely resolved through appropriate
legislation, funding, and cooperation among agencies, and there are also ar-
guments for separation of banking supervision and monetary policy. There
may be a conflict of interest between monetary and banking supervision
goals; for instance, the central bank may not be sufficiently aggressive in
controlling inflation when it fears that higher interest rates would lead to
bank failures. Furthermore, bank failures happen and are often blamed on
the supervisor. Then, if the credibility of the central bank as a bank su-
pervisor is undermined, its credibility in monetary policy could suffer as
well. Also, with new payment-system technology (real-time gross-settlement
systems), central banks do not need to follow payment-system participants
as closely as was previously the case. As the financial system becomes more
diversified and interconnected through financial conglomerates, the moral-
-hazard arguments may be more important and it may be safer for the cen-
tral bank to be separated from supervisory activities. On the other hand,
as pointed out by Briault (1999), there is little evidence that the conflict of
interest has any practical significance – Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995)
did find some positive correlation between the rate of inflation and the com-
bination of monetary and supervisory functions, but it is very difficult to
interpret their results as evidence of any causality. Also, Briault (1997) found
no evidence of any impact of important U.K. bank failures on the credibi-
lity of U.K. monetary policy.
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should become the integrated supervisor. This solution may have practical
advantages, particularly in countries where banking is the main form of in-
termediation and the non-bank financial sector is relatively small, where
the central bank is independent and is in a better position to attract high-
-caliber staff than other government agencies. However, there are also po-
tentially strong disadvantages. First, the moral-hazard issues are likely
more serious if the central bank is to become the integrated supervisor, with
the public expecting the same degree of protection for all institutions su-
pervised by the central bank. Again, public education can lessen but not
solve this problem. Second, inevitable failures in the wide range of super-
visory activities may have a negative impact on the credibility of the cen-
tral bank in monetary policy. Third, there may also be concerns about
the concentration of power in an independent, unelected body, particularly
if there are no strong accountability mechanisms.
One additional consideration is the fundamental difference in the type of
decisions taken by the central bank in monetary policy and decisions taken
in supervision and regulation. This difference may put into question theabi-
lity of a single decision-making body to make both types of decisions effec-
tively and efficiently. Here, the comparison between monetary-policy and
competition-policy decisions put forward by Vickers (2002) appears to 
be relevant. Vickers notes that the monetary-policy decision is basically
the same decision taken repeatedly, simply defined (not simple!), and taken
relatively transparently based on information that is largely publicly avail-
able. The effects of the decision are widespread, and there is no opportu-
nity of appeal by those affected. Supervisory decisions are not taken at apre-
defined time, are based on private and often confidential information, there
are many types of decisions that need to be made, concerned parties may
be significantly affected and have the opportunity to appeal the decision in
court.
It remains unclear whether members of one decision-making body would
have sufficiently broad expertise and experience to be able to make quali-
fied decisions on both monetary policy as well as on a wide range of super-
visory issues from banking to capital markets. If people with different ex-
perience are included in the decision-making body, there is the danger that
the decision-making body will be split into monetary policy and supervisory
parts, each one effectively making decisions in one area. Alternatively, if
the decision-making body relies on staff or an advisory body, the clear lines
of responsibility and accountability may become blurred.8
4. Analysis of International Experience with Integrated
Supervision
In this section, we use available cross-country data on the quality of su-
pervision and on supervisory staffing to investigate whether integrated su-
pervisory agencies have a higher and more consistent quality of supervision
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8 Some countries (e.g., Ireland) tried to resolve this issue by integrating two separate boards in
the central bank.across sectors and whether they are more cost efficient than supervisors un-
der other structures. This type of analysis has not yet been carried out in
a systematic, cross-country fashion. There are only a few studies summa-
rizing the experience in individual country cases, e.g., (Taylor – Fleming,
1999), reviewing the early Northern European experience, and (Carmichael
– Fleming – Llewellyn, 2004).
4.1 Does Integration Mean a Higher Quality of Supervision?
Does integrated supervision mean that there is a higher quality of su-
pervision? Or does integration mean diluting the higher quality of super-
vision in some sectors with a lower quality of supervision in other sectors?
The theoretical literature is unclear on this point, only listing various pros
and cons. In this subsection, we address this question empirically. We largely
leave aside the more general issue of whether and how better supervision
translates into more sound financial systems, even though we offer some
insights on this in Box 1.
To make the empirical analysis tractable, we focus on fully integrated su-
pervisors. As mentioned in Section 2, we define a fully integrated supervi-
sory agency as an agency that is in charge of (micro)prudential supervision
of at least the three main segments of most financial sectors – banking, in-
surance, and securities markets. We introduce an “integrated supervision
dummy” that takes a value of 1 for economies with fully integrated super-
vision (see the list in Table 2) and 0 for all others. In principle, one can also
distinguish partial integration, but we have not done so here, given that
there are different types of such integration and their empirical compari-
son is far from straightforward.
We measure the quality of supervision using the degree of compliance
with internationally accepted standards in banking, insurance, and secu-
rities regulation.9 These are, respectively, the Basel Core Principles for Ef-
fective Banking Supervision (BCP), the International Association of Insu-
rance Supervisors (IAIS), Insurance Core Principles (ICP), and the IOSCO
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO).10 For example,
the BCP contains 25 “Core Principles” (CPs) that include a wide range of
issues in the areas of regulatory governance, prudential framework, regu-
latory practices, and financial integrity.
The methodology for assessing compliance with these standards and codes
is well established,11 and an internal database of assessments based on as-
sessment results has been created by theIMF. Most of theassessments have
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9 While this approach has some limitations – we need to assume that international standards
measure the correct characteristics of the regulatory system and that the assessments are pre-
cise – and data is not available for all countries, we are not aware of any data set measuring
the quality of regulation and supervision that would be more appropriate for our purposes.
10 This approach potentially excludes intermediaries other than banks, insurance companies,
and securities markets, which is likely to bias our results against integrated supervision, as in-
tegrated supervisors are more likely than sectoral supervisors to capture institutions that fall
outside of these three main categories.
11 See http://www.imf.org/external/standards/index.htm for a list and further details on the in-
ternationally recognized standards and codes.been prepared as part of the joint IMF-World Bank assessment program
started in 1999.12 The compliance of each country with each CP is assessed
on a 4-point scale, from compliant to non-compliant, even though the exact
names of the “grades” are slightly different across sectors.
We  explore the relationship between observance of international stan-
dards and the organization of the supervisor (integrated or not) from two
angles. First, we look at the BCP, for which the highest number of assess-
ments is available, construct an index of overall BCP compliance and ex-
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BOX 1 Integrated Supervision and Financial System Soundness
Ideally, we would like to assess how supervisory integration helps in achieving
the ultimate objective of prudential supervision, i.e. a stable and robust financial sec-
tor. However, understanding the links between the quality of supervision (whether
integrated or non-integrated) and financial-sector performance is a very complex
question that has not yet been properly addressed in the literature. We have there-
fore focused in this paper on the link between integration and the quality of super-
vision, measured by compliance with international standards.
As regards financial soundness, let us just observe that countries with integrated
supervision are obviously not absolutely immune to banking sector crises or other
financial sector problems. Ajuxtaposition of thewidely-accepted list of systemic bank-
ing crises in (Caprio – Klingebiel, 2003) and the list of countries with integrated su-
pervisory agencies does not suggest a lower frequency of systemic crises than in
countries in general. In the 28 countries with integrated supervisory agencies, two
cases of systemic banking crises were observed (Norway, 1987–1993, Sweden,
1990–1993) and several episodes of important problems (even though not full-fledged
banking crises) were observed in several other countries with integrated supervisors
– for instance, recent credit card problems in Korea or the 2001 HIH collapse in Aus-
tralia, see (Palmer, 2002). The decision to set up an integrated supervisor was not
a major cause of these financial-sector problems and it is too early to assess whether
the frequency of crises in countries with integrated supervisors is lower or higher
than in other countries, but it is obvious that integrated supervision does not prevent
crises completely.
Other proxies for the „ultimate output” of supervision include soundness indica-
tors. Podpiera (2004) analyzed, using cross-country panel data, whether compliance
with Basel Core Principles brings any measurable benefits, and found that higher le-
vels of BCP compliance are accompanied by lower ratios of nonperforming loans to
total loans, and lower margins. The existing data are not sufficient to perform a full-
-fledged econometric analysis. Nonetheless, as an introductory observation, the re-
sults presented in Table 4 would, in combination with the results in (Podpiera, 2004),
suggest that the presence of integrated supervision is likely to be associated with bet-
ter soundness and performance indicators such as nonperforming loan ratios and in-
terest rate margins. As with the other empirical analyses on this topic, however,
causality remains an open question, i.e. is it that integration leads to better sound-
ness indicators, or that systems with better soundness are more likely to have inte-
grated supervision?
12 Many countries have chosen to publish summaries of the financial sector assessments (Re-
ports on Standards and Codes, or ROSCs). Some have chosen to also publish detailed assess-
ments which include the underlying gradings of the individual principles. The published ROSCs
and detailed assessments are available at the IMF and World Bank websites.plore the relationships between this index and supervisory integration. Se-
cond, we look at all three standards in a consistent way, split the CPs in
each area into four categories and, again, look for any relationship with su-
pervisory integration.
For the BCP, we have a sample of 65 assessments mostly completed in
2000–2002, which includes 33 developing, 19 emerging, and 13 industria-
lized economies – see (Podpiera, 2004) for a detailed list of the countries.
We construct a simple index of overall BCP compliance by assigning values
to assessment grades – compliant (4), largely compliant (3), materially non-
-compliant (2), and non-compliant (1). The value of the index of overall com-
pliance for a given country is equal to the sum of the ratings for individual
CPs.13 Therefore, the actual values of the index of overall BCP compliance
will be between 30 and 120, with higher values indicating a higher degree
of compliance.14 Of the 65 countries in the sample, 12 countries had fully
integrated supervisors at the time of the assessment.
A simple comparison of compliance in countries with integrated supervi-
sion and in other countries could be misleading as integrated supervisors
tend to be found in more developed countries that also have a better ge-
neral regulatory environment. There is a positive relationship between
the general regulatory environment on one hand and the level of imple-
mentation of standards on the other hand (see, for instance, (IMF, 2004)).
We illustrate this problem in Figure 3, which shows the relationship be-
tween BCP compliance and the general regulatory environment as mea-
sured by one of the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKM) (2003) in-
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13 Some principles were “not assessed” or “not applicable.” These were assigned an average va-
lue of compliance of the principles with the available rating for a given country so that these
countries wouldn’t be penalized.
FIGURE 3 BCP Compliance and Overall Regulatory Environment
Notes: Large squares correspond to integrated regulators.
The regulatory environment index includes a measure of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such
as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by exces-
sive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.






























0.0dices.15 The upward-sloping regression line suggests a positive relationship
between these two variables. However, Figure 3 also suggests that inte-
grated supervisors generally have a higher degree of compliance with BCP
even after taking the general regulatory environment into account – 9 out
of 12 integrated supervisors are above the regression line in the scatter plot.
To analyze this more formally, we now turn to regression analysis.
Regression analysis confirms that integrated regulators tend to have
a higher quality of banking supervision, but income level appears to be
a more powerful explanatory variable. The two key variables indicated in
previous research are the quality of the general regulatory environment
(KKM, 2003) and GDP per capita (IMF, 2004). Table 4 presents four diffe-
rent specifications of a regression model, depending on whether we include
one of the two variables, neither of them, or both of them. In all the speci-
fications, the integrated regulator dummy has a positive sign. If we include
no other explanatory variable, the integrated regulator dummy is highly
significant: the BCP compliance index in integrated supervisors is, on ave-
rage, about 14 points higher than in other supervisory agencies. This dif-
ference shrinks to 8 points if we adjust for the higher overall quality of
the regulatory environment in countries with integrated supervision, and
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14 We treat the 6 subcategories of Core Principle 1 (CP1) as separate principles. This does not
have a significant impact on the index – the correlation coefficient of our index (with 6 subca-
tegories treated as separate principles) and an index with only one entry for CP1 (equal to
the average of the 6 subcategories) is 0.991.
15 KKM (2003) describe regulatory quality as being focused on government policies and inclu-
ding measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inade-
quate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation
in areas such as foreign trade and business development.
TABLE 4 Explaining BCP Compliance
(Dependent variable: Index of BCP Compliance)
Model Constant Integrated Quality  of GDP  per Number Adj. R2 DW 
specifi- regulator the overall capita (in of obser- R2 Stat.
cation dummy regulatory PPP, 2000) vations
environment
(1) 87.16*** 14.29***
(2.29) (4.56) ... ... 65 0.09 0.11 2.00
(2) 83.37*** 8.23* 10.23***
(2.33) (4.44) (3.18) ... 65 0.23 0.26 2.03
(3) 77.60*** 4.67 0.001***
(2.42) (4.69) ... (0.0002) 65 0.43 0.45 2.06
(4) 77.56*** 4.80 -0.75 0.001***
(2.48) (4.87) (2.68) (0.0002) 65 0.43 0.45 2.06
Notes: */**/*** denotes significance level of 10/5/1 percent. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation; the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent.
Index of BCP compliance is defined as the sum of gradings from 4 (compliant) to 1 (noncompliant) for indi-
vidual CPs 2–25 and 6 sub-principles of CP 1. Quality of the regulatory environment as per KKM (2003). This
includes a measure of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank
supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as fo-
reign trade and business development. PPP denotes purchasing power parity.it shrinks further in half (and becomes insignificant) when we adjust for
the higher GDP per capita in countries with integrated regulatory agen-
cies. Regression (4) needs to be interpreted carefully, given that there is
a positive correlation between the two explanatory variables, i.e. the qua-
lity of the regulatory environment and GDP per capita.16
Turning to the three sectors of banking, insurance, and securities mar-
kets, we use a sample of 36 countries for which assessments of compliance
of all three sectors were prepared.17 As the CPs in these sectors are diffe-
rent, we need to transform the assessment results to be able to compare
the quality of supervision across sectors. Following the methodology pro-
posed in (IMF, 2004), we look at the following four main components of good
regulation: (i) regulatory governance, which includes the aims, indepen-
dence, and accountability of regulators; (ii) prudential framework, i.e. risk
management, capital adequacy, internal control, and corporate governance;
(iii) regulatory practices, i.e. monitoring and supervision, enforcement, con-
glomerates, and licensing; and (iv) financial integrity/safety net, including
consumer protection and addressing financial crimes. For alisting of theCPs
included in each of the four components, see Table 5.
For each of the four components, a compliance index was constructed, in
a similar way as the BCP compliance index above, across countries and
standards. The assessment of each principle was transformed into a nu-
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nents Banking Insurance  Securities
(BCP) (ICP)a (IOSCO)
Regulatory  Objectives of regulation 1, 19 1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
gover- Independence and adequate resources 6, 7
nance Enforcement powers and capabilities
Clarity and transparency of regulatory 
process
External participation
Prudential  Risk management 2, 3, 4, 6,  2, 3, 4, 5,  8, 9, 10, 11,
framework Risk concentration 16, 17, 18,   12, 13, 15,  12, 13, 29
Capital requirements 20, 22, 23,  16, 17
Corporate governance 24, 25
Internal controls
Regulatory  Group-wide supervision 5, 6, 7, 8, 6, 7, 9, 10 17, 18, 20,
practices Monitoring and on-site inspection 9, 10, 11, 21, 22, 23,
Reporting to supervisors 12, 13, 14 25, 27
Enforcement
Cooperation and information sharing
Confidentiality
Licensing, ownership transfer, corporate 
control
Qualifications
Financial  Markets (integrity, financial crime) 15, 21 11, 16 14, 15, 16,
integrity  Consumer protection 19, 24, 26, 
and safety  Information, disclosure, transparency 28, 30
nets
Note: a The allocation of insurance principles are based on the 2000 IAIS standard.
Source: (IMF, 2004)meric value from 4 (compliant) to 1 (noncompliant) and the compliance in-
dex was calculated as a simple average of the CPs included in a given com-
ponent.
Integrated supervisory agencies also tend to have a higher quality of not
only banking supervision, but also insurance supervision and securities re-
gulation, measured by compliance with therelevant international standards
(BCP, ICP, and IOSCO, respectively). The quality of supervision as mea-
sured by the four components is also correlated with the level of economic
development approximated by GDP per capita.18 The BCP results in Table 6
are consistent with the more detailed BCP analysis presented earlier in
Table 4, i.e. after an adjustment for the level of GDP per capita in countries
with integrated supervisory agencies, we still find a positive point estimate
of the integrated supervisor dummy, but these estimates are not statisti-
cally significant. On the other hand, for insurance (ICP) and securities
(IOSCO), the integration dummy retains its statistical significance in some
cases even after per capita income is taken into account. Namely, this is
true for regulatory practices (insurance), prudential framework (securities),
and financial integrity/safety net (both insurance and securities).
Whether the integrated supervision is located inside or outside the cen-
tral bank does not have a significant impact on the quality of supervision.
We have tried to distinguish in the regressions in Table 4 and Table 6 in-
tegrated regulators in central banks from those outside central banks, but
the estimated coefficients were generally not significant.
The regression results need to be interpreted with caution. In particular,
the estimations do not look at causality and should not be interpreted in
a causal way. The estimates do not make it possible to determine whether
integration leads to a higher quality of supervision, or whether supervisory
agencies with a higher quality of supervision are more likely to get inte-
grated.
4.2 Does Integration Mean More Consistent Supervision Across
Sectors?
More consistent regulation and supervision across sectors is one of the im-
portant suggested advantages of integrated supervision. The data on
the four components of the BCP, ICP, and IOSCO standards described above
– regulatory governance, prudential framework, regulatory practices, and
financial integrity/safety net – allow us to test whether integrated super-
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16 The correlation coefficient between the quality of the regulatory environment and GDP per
capita (both in 2000) was 0.75. We have also replaced the quality of the regulatory environment
with a KKM (2003) measure of “government effectiveness” which includes indicators of the qua-
lity of public-service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants,
the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the govern-
ment’s commitment to policies. The results were very similar.
17This is thesame sample used in IMF (2004) and consists of 10industrialized countries, 12emer-
ging market countries, and 14 developing countries.
18 As for the BCP estimation above, we have also included variables measuring the quality of
the regulatory environment and government effectiveness, but they were not significant in al-
most all specifications when GDP per capita was also included.visors achieve a more consistent quality of regulation across the three sec-
tors (i.e., banking, insurance, and securities market). For each of the four
components, we use the variation coefficient (standard deviation/average)
across the three sectors as a measure of consistency. Again, as one would
expect more developed countries to have amore consistent regulatory frame-
work for the whole financial sector, we include GDP per capita (in pur-
chasing power parity, PPP) as a control variable.
Our results suggest that integrated supervisory agencies indeed tend to
have a more consistent quality of supervision across the sectors they su-
pervise (Table 7). We have found that integrated supervisors have a lower
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TABLE 6 Explaining BCP, ICP and IOSCO Compliance by Main Components
(Dependent variables: indices of BCP, ICP, and IOSCO compliance, respectively)




Regulatory 3.02*** 0.02 2.08*** 36 0.21 0.25 1.97
governance (0.11) (0.16) (0.53)
Prudential 2.92*** 0.08 2.17*** 36 0.34 0.38 2.33
framework (0.10) (0.15) (0.53)
Regulatory 2.62*** 0.13 2.81*** 36 0.33 0.36 2.25
practices (0.13) (0.19) (0.72)
Financial 2.50*** 0.06 3.89*** 36 0.35 0.38 2.00
integrity/safety (0.20) (0.23) (1.25)
net
Insurance (ICP)
Regulatory 2.36*** 0.23 2.38*** 34 0.13 0.18 2.36
governance (0.22) (0.26) (0.85)
Prudential 2.93*** 0.15 1.92*** 36 0.27 0.31 2.05
framework (0.11) (0.14) (0.52)
Regulatory 2.51*** 0.36** 2.40*** 36 0.33 0.37 2.28
practices (0.16) (0.14) (0.50)
Financial 2.32*** 0.42* 3.21*** 36 0.31 0.35 2.46
integrity/safety (0.21) (0.21) (0.90)
net
Capital markets (IOSCO)
Regulatory 2.90*** 0.11 2.03** 36 0.16 0.20 2.20
governance (0.16) (0.20) (0.75)
Prudential 2.45*** 0.42* 2.96*** 36 0.37 0.41 2.41
framework (0.14) (0.23) (0.70)
Regulatory 2.94*** 0.14 2.22*** 36 0.17 0.21 2.51
practices (0.17) (0.18) (0.62)
Financial 2.52*** 0.34* 2.89*** 36 0.39 0.42 2.24
integrity/safety (0.13) (0.19) (0.13)
net
Notes: */**/*** denotes significance level of 10/5/1 percent. Standard errors are in parentheses.
OLS estimation; the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent.
The indices of BCP, ICP, and IOSCO compliance were calculated as a simple average of the CPs included in
a given component; please see the discussion in the text above. We have also included variables measuring
the quality of the regulatory environment and government effectiveness, but they were not significant in al-
most all specifications when GDP per capita was also included. PPP denotes purchasing power parity.variation coefficient of the degree of compliance with international stan-
dards and the impact of integration seems to be higher in the area of regu-
latory practices and financial integrity/safety net and generally holds even
after the level of development of an economy (GDP per capita in PPP) is
taken into account.
4.3 Does Integration Help Reduce Resource Costs?
One of the arguments in favor of integrated supervision is the possibility
that integration may lower costs, both for supervisors and for the super-
vised institutions. Data that would allow us to analyze changes in the regu-
latory burden are scant at best. We therefore focus on supervisory staff re-
sources, for which cross-country data are available in the annual report
“How Countries Supervise Their Banks, Insurers, and Securities Markets”
published by Central Banking Publications (the latest edition available to
us was from 2004). As far as we know, these data have not yet been used
for this type of analysis.
We find that integrating supervision does not lead to substantial super-
visory staff reduction (Table 8). We have tried to explain the number of su-
pervisory staff by country population, area, the level of development (ap-
proximated by GDP per capita), and the size of the financial sector (ap-
proximated by M2/GDP). We have found that population matters, as does
the country’s level of development. The dummy variable for integrated re-
gulators has the expected negative sign, but the reduction in staffing asso-
ciated with supervisory integration was not statistically significant. There
may be several reasons for this. First, the time since integration has in most
cases not yet been sufficient for the cost savings to materialize. Second, we
121 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 56, 2006, ã. 3-4
TABLE 7 Explaining Variability in Compliance with International Standards
Dependent variable: Variation coefficient (standard deviation/average) of an index of
compliance with international standards of supervision in banking, insurance, and se-
curities markets
Constant Integrated  GDP per Number of Adj. R2 R2 DW Stat.
regulator capita observa-
dummy (in PPP)a tions
Regulatory 0.25*** -0.04 -0.37*** 36 0.15 0.20 2.36
governance (0.03) (0.03) (0.12)
Prudential 0.18*** -0.04 -0.28*** 36 0.26 0.30 2.04
framework (0.01) (0.03) (0.10)
Regulatory 0.21*** -0.05*** -0.31*** 36 0.39 0.42 2.66
practices (0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Financial 0.22*** -0.06* -0.24 36 0.12 0.17 1.94
integrity/safety (0.03) (0.03) (0.15)
net
Overall 0.15*** -0.04* -0.17** 36 0.19 0.24 1.76
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Notes: */**/*** denotes significance level of 10/5/1 percent. Standard errors are in parentheses.
a Coefficients multiplied by 105.
OLS estimation; the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent. PPP denotes purchasing power pa-
rity.look at supervisory staff numbers, not at total staff numbers, so there could
be some savings in support staff that we do not observe. Third, there may
be no savings in supervisory staff because in some cases theintegrated regu-
lator took on new responsibilities that the previous regulators did not have
(e.g., supervision of additional types of financial firms, or functions previ-
ously not covered, such as consumer protection) or, fourth, there may not
be any true synergies among the sectors that would allow for supervisory
staff savings.
In addition to this cross-country analysis, we have also looked at changes
in supervisory staffing over time in countries that introduced integrated 
supervision, compared to other countries. The cross-country supervisory
staffing data are available only for 1996–2003 (Central Banking Publica-
tions, 1999–2004), which limits the time dimension of our analysis. We have
therefore focused on supervisory agencies that were integrated during
1998–2002, and compared the total staffing of all the supervisory agencies
in the country at the end of 1996 with the staffing of the integrated agency
at the end of 2003. Similarly to the cross sectional analysis, we have found
no evidence of a systematic reduction in supervisory staffing, even though
there were individual country cases when such reduction took place (Fi-
gure 4). On average, supervisory staffing in the 61 countries for which we
had observations increased by 23 percent between 1996 and 2003. For
the sub-sample of 14 countries that underwent integration of supervisory
agencies between 1998 and 2002, supervisory staffing also increased in
the same period; this increase was smaller on average (16 percent), but this
difference was not significant (the standard deviation of the changes was
27 percent). Countries with supervisory agencies integrated before 1998
recorded anabove-average increase in staffing in thesame period (by 41per-
cent, with standard deviation of 26 percent). These findings are in line with
the results of the cross-country analysis presented in Table 7. In particu-
lar, they suggest that integration of supervisory agencies is not associated
with substantial reductions in supervisory staff.
122 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 56, 2006, ã. 3-4
TABLE 8 Integrated Supervision and Staffing
Dependent variable: Total number of professional supervisory staff
Model Con- Inte- Popu- GDPper Areaa M2/GDP No. of Adj. R2 R2 DW




(1) -999* -69.6 238*** 96.4 10.3 2.21 55 0.43 0.49 1.97
(584) (127) (55.9) (70.9) (48.6) (2.63)
(2) -1,018* -102 244*** 123** -6.92 ... 58 0.43 0.47 1.96
(562) (128) (51.4) (56.0) (36.7)
(3) -1,063** -108 236*** 127** ... ... 58 0.44 0.47 1.95
(450) (121) (38.5) (48.3)
(4) -442*** -70.5 ... ... ... ... 64 -0.01 0.003 2.33
(106) (153)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*/**/*** denotes significance level of 10/5/1 percent.
PPP denotes purchasing power parity.
a logarithm5. Conclusions
The theoretical literature on integrated supervision is relatively incon-
clusive. The prevalent view is that there is no optimal supervisory struc-
ture (Camichael, 2004), but that there are various pros and cons that need
to be taken into consideration in individual country cases.
Our empirical results lead to several preliminary conclusions:
– We found that countries with integrated supervisory agencies enjoy great-
er consistency in the quality of supervision across supervised institutions,
even though a part of the difference is due to the higher level of develop-
ment in countries with integrated supervisory agencies.
– This higher consistency is not associated with diluting the overall qua-
lity of supervision; on the contrary, we find that integrated supervision 
is associated with a higher overall quality of supervision. For banking,
the higher quality can be explained by an above-average level of economic
development in the countries that have opted for integrated supervision
so far. For insurance and securities markets, the higher level cannot be
fully explained by economic level, suggesting that other factors, notably
integration of supervision, may be at play. Overall, these results may be
interpreted as suggesting that integration, while not having an impact on
banking regulation, helps increase the quality of regulation in other sec-
tors and thus improves consistency and overall quality of regulation.
– Whether the integrated supervision is located inside or outside the cen-
tral bank does not appear to have a significant impact on the quality of
supervision.
– Integrating supervision does not seem to be associated with significant
reduction of supervisory staff. This may be either because the time since
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FIGURE 4 Supervisory Staffing in Countries with Integrated Supervision, 1996–2003
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to materialize or because there are no cost savings (e.g., because the in-
tegrated supervisors took on new responsibilities). It is also possible that
there are savings in support staff and support activities, but cross-coun-
try data on these are not available.
The preliminary conclusions in this paper suggest that integrated su-
pervision may be associated with benefits in terms of increased supervi-
sory consistency and quality. This strengthens the case in favor of inte-
grated supervision in the medium- to long-term. It should be noted,
however, that while our methods and results are useful in illustrating in-
ternational trends, they cannot serve as a substitute for detailed analysis
of the specific institutional and economic factors in individual countries.
Country authorities considering whether to integrate their supervisory
framework need to compare the likely medium- and long-term benefits (in
particular, of having a single institution with the potential for better in-
formation flows and more consistent supervisory practices, better super-
vision of conglomerates, and possible cost savings on support activities)
with the short-term challenges and risks involved in the integration pro-
cess and in the chosen model.
There are a number of topics to follow up on in further research, in par-
ticular:
– Degree of integration. The presented paper compared fully integrated 
supervisory agencies with all others. This “zero-one” approach made
the analysis more straightforward, but abstracted from the fact that there
is a continuum of degrees of integration. In future research, one could in-
vestigate whether creating partially integrated supervisors is an im-
provement over the purely sectoral model. The key challenge in this ap-
proach is how to define, in an objective and cross-country comparable way,
the many different degrees of supervisory integration. Also, some nonin-
tegrated supervisory agencies may have in place a good framework for co-
operation, while some supervisory agencies may be integrated only on pa-
per. Moreover, in some countries, there is an integrated prudential
regulator but a small part of the responsibilities is, for practical reasons,
carried out by a cooperating agency. These factors are likely to play a role
but are much more difficult to model. Therefore, we have used the zero-
-one approach in this paper, but including a more continuous definition
of integration is a challenge for future research.
– Burden on financial institutions. An important argument in favor of in-
tegrated supervision is that it helps reduce the regulatory burden. Only
limited data are presently available to address this question. These data
suggest that integration indeed leads to some reduction in regulatory over-
laps and duplicities. If more complete data become available, a more rigo-
rous analysis of this issue can be carried out, most likely strengthening
the arguments for integrated supervision.
– Cross-border integration. Recent policy papers on supervision have de-
voted substantial attention to the modalities of home-host supervisory co-
operation (e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). In terms
of empirical research, however, this subject has received even less atten-
tion than domestic supervisory integration.
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dels of integrated supervision. At present, the theoretical literature con-
sists of formal models focusing on banking supervision (e.g., (Dewatripont
– Tirole, 1994)), and various lists of pros and cons not based on an explicit
model.
– Supervision of conglomerates. Given that the increased importance of con-
glomerates has been one of the key stated reasons for integration, it would
be useful to explore directly whether integrated supervisors are more suc-
cessful in creating and implementing a consistent and complete frame-
work for the supervision of conglomerates. The methodology used in
the empirical section of this paper addresses the issue, but only using in-
direct methods.
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Is One Watchdog Better than Three?
International Experience with Integrated Financial-
-Sector Supervision
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Over the past two decades, there has been a clear trend toward integrating the re-
gulation and supervision of banks, nonbank financial institutions, and securities
markets. This paper reviews the international experience with integrated supervi-
sion. We survey the theoretical arguments for and against the integrated supervi-
sory model, and use data on compliance with international standards to assess
the validity of some of these arguments. We find that (i) integration is associated
with a higher quality of supervision in insurance and securities and a higher con-
sistency of supervision across sectors, after controlling for level of development; and
(ii) integrated supervision is not associated with a significant reduction in supervi-
sory staff.
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